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CYCLICAL AND SUBCYCLICAL FLUCTUATION: PROCESS
The necessary condition that the explanation be consist-
ent with all the statistical facts is not sufficient to
specify the explanation. It must be pieced out by infor-
mation from other sources and logical inference. Mak-
ing full use of both fact and inference, I formulate a
description of the cyclical and subcycical process in the
industry. Though individual pieces may have the wrong
emphasis or be actually in error, the picture as a whole
—the picture of short fluctuation having an intrinsic
reciprocating mechanism of a complicated design—
may, I believe, be drawn with confidence.
Subcyclical Fluctuations
I shall deal first with subcyclical fluctuations. Orig-
inally given a place in this investigation because they
were there and because they facilitated comparisons
among time series, they have usurped the center of at-
tention. For a single industry sequence, there are only
a few significant distinctions to be made between the
processes whereby the major and the minor turns come
about; in contrast, the processes of cumulation during
cyclical and subcycical expansion or contraction have
certain notable differences which will be dealt with
later.
CUMULATINGEXPANSION
Assume that activity in the industry has recently
reached a bottom and recovery is in process; the point
of observation might be a few months after a trough.
Assume also that consumer income and buying is ris-
ing or at least has ceased to fall. Many activities tend to
rise at this point. Some have been rising for several
months—wholesale sales, retailers' orders for shoes and
shoe manufacturers' for leather, shipments of leather by
tanners and their receipts of domestic hides. Consumer
shoe buying, production of shoes and leather, as well
as leather and hide prices, have recently started to rise,
as have stocks of leather held by leather-goods manu-
facturers and stocks of hides held by tanners. But the
reservoir stocks, such as leather held by tanners and
hides held by packers, butchers, or dealers, have started
to fall as a consequence of the increased demand. The
more sluggish aggregate of shoe stocks held by retailers
is still falling though about to cease.
The expansion which is under way is fed at many
points. Increasing consumer buying requires increased
activity of shoe retailer and producer in order to keep
up with it. In addition, distributors and producers often
find it advantageous to buy more than they sell. The
process feeds on itself. It has a somewhat different char-
acter at each of the vertical stages.
For shoe retailers, four major elements, and some-
times five, may cause orders to increase:
1. Retailers order more because they are selling
more.
2. Operating efficiency demands larger stocks to serv-
ice larger sales, though ones less than proportionately
larger; buying increases to supply the desired incre-
ments to stock.
3. Though shoe factories still have considerable ex-
cess capacity, the season's favorite models are likely to
be hard to get at short notice in time for the seasonal
peaks. In any case, deliveries may slow up, or be ex-
pected to slow up, so retailers place orders to provide
the increment necessitated by the longer waiting pe-
riod. They are also likely, if not immediately, at least
soon, to feel it necessary to insure adequate choice and
prompt delivery by increasing the portion of the ex-
pected season's requirements ordered several months
ahead of the delivery deadline.
4. Relatively more advance buying may be based
also on expectations that shoe prices will rise or quality
deteriorate. Suppliers may offer price inducements for
orders placed well ahead of time. The importance of
the two factors, (3) and (4), which involve the timing
of buying, will increase, at least for a while, as expan-
sion continues. They result in buying that exceeds sales
(an extension of the ownership position) but not neces-
sarily—except in connection with the longer delivery
periods—in receipts that exceed sales (an increase of
stocks on hand).
5. Because there seems to be a tendency for esti-
mates of future sales to be biased in the direction of
current sales, during expansion, actual sales tend to be
greater than expected; consequently, unintended re-
ductions in stocks occur. Since it is important for re-
tailers to keep their stocks in close accord with planned
stock, they endeavor to recoup the deficiency through
additional buying. This element in buying does not ma-
terially increase the amplitude of fluctuation at the
earlier stages relative to the finished one but simplyTHE PROCESS OF FLUCTUATION 241
makes up, in part, for the lag relative to consumer buy-
ing that would otherwise be present.
Wholesalers respond to (1), (3),. and (4), and to
(3) and (4) probably more strongly than retailers do.
Also, they doubtless, in a rough sort of way, need more
stocks to transact more sales (2). Correction for unin-
tended inventory change (5) probably is not important
for wholesalers, since the precise and high-priority in-
ventory objectives upon which prompt correction of un-
intended change in stocks depends may well not be
present for most shoe wholesalers.
Shoe manufacturers increase their production sched-
ules to keep up with orders actually on hand or confi-
dently expected, and they buy leather with a view to
having it on hand when it will be required. Thus they,
like distributors, buy more because they sell more (1).
The operating need for larger stocks to service larger
sales (2) also applies here but with markedly less force,
since shoe manufacturers typically know a large part of
their leather requirements in time to acquire leather.
This is a function of the large amount of shoes produced
to order, the short production period, and rapid deliv-
eries of leather resulting from the large stocks of fin-
ished or semifinished leather held ready or almost ready
for sale by tanners. Under these circumstances little
increase in stocks is strictly necessary.1 However, it is
doubtless convenient to have somewhat more leather
both on hand and on order when sales rise, for it is
more convenient and less expensive to buy in larger
lots. The fact that it may take longer to get leather de-
livered (3), particularly when it must be finished to
customers' specification and especially during peak
seasons, would also account for additional buying.
But shoe manufacturers have an important reason
for an extension of the amount of leather on hand and
on order if they expect rising leather prices (4). For
these business firms seem to be characterized by a
group of attributes likely to maximize the advantage of
a correct anticipation of prices: a finished article whose
price is sticky; a clearly bounded period of option for
buying the materials to be used for a particular order—
a period very short at its minimum (a few days to re-
ceive leather and two weeks in process), and quite long
at its maximum (the two or three or more months for
which shoe orders are on the books); strongly fluctuat-
ing materials prices, which put a premium on guessing
right; suppliers who are willing and anxious to book ad-
vance orders and probably willing, under the proper
circumstances, to offer price concessions to get them;
and an article that at least in some of its forms has low
storage costs, staple style, and physical durability.
1Forexample, if we can trust the figures, the very high level
of operation after 1939 was carried on with exceptionally small
stocks of leather actually on hand (see Chart 25).
The tanner is the first in the sequence who does not
seem to buy more at this phase of the subcycle than
he sells. He welcomes the opportunity to decrease his
finished or (for upper leather) partly finished stocks
of leather, which are high at this stage. Furthermore,
the ample cushion of finished and in-process stocks
eliminates the need to keep raw materials stocks in any
set relation to output (2). Nor is there any clearly pre-
determined size of raw stocks that would involve
prompt corrections if not achieved (5).Deliveryperi-
ods for domestic hides have not lengthened, though a
larger proportion of requirements are filled by imported
hides taking, of course, longer to deliver.
There are times, however, when tanners do seem to
extend their ownership position in hides (though not in
total stocks). The evidence consists of departures from
the usual relationships between leather production and
tanners' ownership position in in-process and raw hides.
The periods of extension seem rarer than for the other
stages. Only when prices are low as well as rising (4)
do they appear to occur. They may simply reflect a par-
tial countermove on the part of tanners to spurts in the
buying of their customers. In any event, whatever the
motivation, the extension in tanners' position in hides
seems more than compensated by a reduction in their
position in leather. The rate of change of inventories of
all sorts more usually falls than rises (the difference be-
tween hide receipts and leather shipments narrows). In-
deed, tanners often ship more leather than they receive
hides so stocks proper actually decline as often as they
rise. It is not surprising to find tanners' respotise to
changed market expectations more hedged by limita-
tions than is the response of shoe manufacturers. Pos-
sibly the hide exchange, at least after the mid-thirties,
provided a means for taking a market position in hide
futures (as contrasted with actual hides) though I am
inclined to assign a minor role to this alternative. More
critical is the fact that many of the attributes we listed
as encouraging price-prospect-based buying for shoe
manufacturers are notably absent for tanners. Instead,
heavy purchasing of hides on the basis of a correct ex
ante guess about the direction in which hide prices will
move is likely, ex post, to result in a reduction in leather
prices and increases in hide prices, other things the
same, with consequent reduction in tanners' operating
margins. Only if advantage is great enough and sure
enough to outweigh this effect is extension desirable.
But though tanners tend to be contracting their total
market position in hides and leather at this stage of the
subcycle, they are nevertheless buying increasingly
more than the current kill of packer hides
stocks are falling at an accelerating rate). This places
pressure on the price structure. An expansion contin-
ues; sales spiral upward all along the line. Consumer242 CHAPTER17
buying is increasing, but retailers' and wholesalers' pur-
chases of shoes and shoe manufacturers' purchases of
leather are greater than purchases by the final con-
sumer. The excess is partly the result of the need for
larger stocks to do more business and to compensate
for lengthened delivery periods. It is also based on ex-
pectations of further difficulty in getting deliveries
promptly and, especially in the case of leather, on ex-
pectations that prices will rise. The expectation-moti-
vated action tends to make the expectations come true.
But expectation that a certain price will rise is just
one element. in the complex of factors causing prices to
rise. Let us consider the vertical sequence of prices, as
we have the sequence of demand. This time it seems
more natural to start at the raw-material end.
Hides prices are rising as the quantity demanded in-
creases and a higher price is required to attract addi-
tional hide supplies to central markets of this country.
Soon buyers of hides and leather start to expect further
rises in prices. These expectations may be based on an
analysis of the supply of, hides compared with the de-
mand for leather and shoes, or on the recent course of
hide and leather prices, including their rate of change.
Expectations may also be based on information ob-
tained in the course of buying and selling—the eager-
ness of buyers, the nonchalance of sellers, delivery
terms that are being requested and accepted, the prey-'
alence of unused capacity, the amount of unfilled
orders on the books, knowledge about the size of stocks
held all along the line, the volume of trading. Judg-
ments may be influenced by the behavior of other corn-
mbclity prices and stock exchange quotations.
That prices of hides and of cattle-hide leathers do
rise with the added buying is intrinsic to the dynamics
of fluctuation. Chapter 15 explained it in terms of
shifts in market demand and supply schedules, as well
as in the upward slope of the supply schedule.
For shoe prices the rise is far slower in getting under
way. Indeed, many subcydical expansions come and go
without a rise recorded in the indexes for either whole-
sale or retail shoe prices. Resistance comes perhaps
most clearly from retailers, who fear loss of business be-
cause of consumers' resistance to new price lines. Shoe
manufacturers cooperate by changing the labor and
materials input, in other words, by converting a change
in price into a change in the quality of their finished
wares. Also, they buy ahead to forestall a rise in costs.
They tolerate a reduced margin over direct costs per
shoe in view of the lower unit overhead expense and
larger aggregate profits (even if unit profits fall) re-
sulting from the larger volume. But as expansion con-
tinues, the resistance starts tO weaken as signs sug-
gest that consumer buying power will support an ex-
plicit rise in prices: a continued and strong rise in con-
sumer income; trading up (a shift of purchasing to
higher from lower price lines, other things the same);
and multiple sales in hosiery if not in shoes. Manu-
facturers' demand for price increases is strengthened
when inventories of low price leathers are exhausted
and shoe manufacturers, uniformly experiencing higher
costs, all' ask higher prices.
We saw in Chapter 15 that the shift from a change in
quality to an explicit change in price for shoes may,
other things the same, reinforce the rise in prices for
hides. But whether or not shoe prices have actually
started to rise in the particular subcycle phase, the
cumulative process proceeds. Explicitly rising prices of
leather and hides validate expectations of a rise. Ex-
pectations of a further rise, through their influence on
traders' standards and actions, promote the actual rise.
The movement spreads as the number of optimistic
traders increases, as does also the size of the advance
position each is willing to take with regard to an in-
creasing variety of items. The situation, duplicated for
other sorts of expectations—such as those involving
difficulty in getting choice merchandise promptly—
feeds upon itself, at least for a while.
The typical picture, then, is one of rising consumer
shoe buying, increasing service stocks all along the line,
expectations that make further advance preparations
seem the part of caution, a further rise in buying, and a
further spread and intensification of optimistic expec-
tations; and this spiral within the industry is typically
supported by rising consumer income and often by
rising prices in other fields.2 Can the spiral continue
indefinitely? If not, what brings it to a halt?
THEPEAK
Theoretically,expansion in a single industry could
continue as long as income generated in other industries
is adequate to sustain a growth in consumer buying of
its product sufficient to counteract any forces of de-
terioration at earlier stages in the production process.
However, our study of the shoe, leather, hide sequence
indicates that a tendency toward deterioration sets in
after an upward swing has continued for a while, even
if consumer income and the dollar volume of consumer
shoe buying is still rising. Many factors may contribute:
1. Physical versus Dollar Volume of Consumer Buy-
ing.Ifprices of shoes are rising, it is possible that
though income and the dollar volume of sales are still
increasing, the physical volume of final sales may have
ceased to rise. If so, the physical demand for shoes,
leather, and hides is subjected to this deteriorating in-
2 For the association of subcycles in income and shoe sales
see Chapter 6, Charts 9 and 10. Conformity indexes between
specific subcydes in hide prices and several other "sensitive"
commodity prices were shown in Chapter 4, Table 12.THE PROCESS OF FLUCTUATION 243
fluence. This situation is probably rare, though it may
have had something to do with the early turn of pro-
duction relative to retail sales in 1987.
2. Correction of Error in Anticipating Sales. If the
rate of increase in the physical volume of shoe buying
by consumers starts to decline, even though buying is
still increasing, a tendency toward reversal is set in
motion.8 Briefly, retailers must order some part of their
expected requirements several months ahead on the
basis of a guess as to what they will need. The central
tendencies of these guesses will have the form of a
straight-line projection (either horizontal or slanting)
of current sales. Consequently, the guess is likely to
prove too low when sales rise at an increasing rate and
stocks are raided to meet the unexpected sales. But
since retailers' intentions concerning stocks are formu-
lated with precision and stoutly enforced, orders for
immediate delivery attempt to restore inventories to
their desired level. These orders, reversing the pattern
of the error of the estimate, tend to follow the rate of
change in sales. Total orders are the sum of the guesses
about the future and the correction of incorrect guesses
of the past. The first accord with current sales, the
second their rate of change or first differences. When
sales cease to rise at an increasing rate, the second
component declines. Sometimes, though probably not
very often, this will cause total orders for shoes to
decline before sales proper decline, independently of
other elements that might push in the same direction.
In any event, whenever the rate at which sales rise has
actually declined, the sales of those firms or depart-
ments of firms that specialize in at-once orders tend to
decline. These specialists are likely to be wholesalers or
in-stock departments of manufacturers. Since their
sales are often watched with special care by members
of the industry,they have an influence on in-
dustry behavior that is greater than the portion of total
business they handle.4
3. Sales-Linked Stock Objective. Retardation in the
rise of sales prior to its actual turn affects buying when
this is associated with an intention of enforcing a given
average or incremental ratio of stocks to sales. Were the
objective tightly held, buying intended to supply the
desired increments would decline as soon as, or shortly
after, the rate of increase in sales began to slacken.
However, though at least for retail stores it seems likely
that stocks are intended to bear some defined positive
association to sales, the intention does not appear pre-
3Thisfact was mentioned briefly in connection with the process
of expansion (5) but its chief interest lies in the power to set
turns ahead; it was developed at length in Chapter 8.
The same point may apply to other suppliers who are known
to experience early turns—those in working-class neighborhoods
in large industrial centers or (for a downturn) the marginal small
merchants.
cise or firm enough for periods of a few months (in
contrast to the firm intentions to hold to a abso-
lute, planned, model stock) to cause associated pro-
vision for changes in stocks to reach peaks ahead of
sales, especially since the period by which retardation
precedes the peak in sales is often short.
For shoe manufacturers, the flexible time in produc-
tion and the many other matters that bear on the size of
stocks suggest that any possible link between sales and
stocks, whether automatic or intended, could not be
sufficiently tight to create a timing acceleration of buy-
ing. For tanners, the basic inverse association of stock
and output precludes the possibility of a timing accel-
erator of this standard type.5 In general, we have found
little evidence that the management objective of a
positive association of sales and stocks would be capa-
ble, except very rarely, of contributing toward bring-
ing expansion to an end.
4. The Long-Short Market Range. Factors besed on
expectations of lengthening delivery periods and higher
prices, do, however, seem to have the potentiat power
to terminate expansion. The stimulation that they im-
part tends to reach natural limits and then dectine. To
maintain a stimulating impact on buying, the market
position must undergo progressive extension. Extension
has three dimensions: the number of firms that partic-
ipate in extending forward positions; the proportion
of the many materials used by a given firm for which
such provision is being made; and, for each material,
the number of weeks' supply covered by actital pur-
chase or forward orders. The limit to the first is obvious
—none or all; yet susceptibility to optimistic or pessi-
mistic expectations is a trait possessed in differing de-
gree by various individuals, so that the spread of par-
ticipation in expansion must start to slow up far short of
the theoretical limit. As to the second, there seems to be
a recognized hierarchy of articles for a given sort of
business on which advance buying will concentrate. To
illustrate, for a shoe manufacturer the sequence might
be:sole leather, white, black, and tan side-upper
leather, and, finally, certain style varieties of upper
leather that are certainly not prone to inclusion, though
not immune. As he proceeds down the list, a given ex-
pectation concerning availability or price change, held
with a given firmness, will motivate less and tess ad-
vance buying. In this industry, limits to the third—the
number of months for which advance provision may be
made—are largely a function of the stability of style of
The possibility may exist at one spot: for in-promss sole
leather the association to hide wettings was exceedingly close;
but it seems unlikely that this automatic result of pro-
duction would impose constraints on the buying of hIdes of a
sort that would tend to imprint upon buying the rate of change
of sole leather wettings, other things the same. If anything, the
causal connection would run in the opposite direction.244 CHAPTER 17
the article, and of the customary seasonal patterns in
selling, buying, and in the extension and repayment of
commercial credit.
The description indicates that limits to either exten-
sion or contraction of the ownership position are bands
rather than lines. In a period when very optimistic
views are surely and widely held, the upper end of the
long-short market range moves farther out than at a
time when optimism is more cautious. The short end is
likewise not sharply defined, for even what is com-
monly called a hand-to-mouth position comprehends
some advance provision—more sometimes than others.
The point is simply that business mores deal with these
matters; the ranges have meaning within a trade. Thus,
for staple, popular grades of men's shoes, the desired
on-hand-and-on-order position of retailers may range
from around a three-weeks' supply to four months' or
even more; for women's high-style shoes, both the mini-
mum and maximum depend on whether it is early or
late in the season, and in any event, something less than
the estimated season's requirement is the maximum
even for particular models. Shoe manufacturers typi-
cally do not consider it safe to operate with less than a
month's supply of leather on hand and on order,
whereas the maximum position may run over half a
year for sole leather. A four months' commitment is
probably fairly high for even the most staple sorts of
upper leather, and for the less staple varieties, a few
months may be the maximum.6 Just where resistance to
further extension starts to build up depends on how
strong are the factors making for optimistic prognosis at
a given time. But when this area is reached, enforce-
ment of the customary limits is not left entirely to
the individuals immediately concerned. Three self-ap-
pointed agents may be concerned in terminating move-
ment toward the long end of the range. Banks may re-
fuse further credit or even call demand loans if the
inventory position appears extended, as is quite appar-
ent if loans are not liquidated at the customary times
each season. Suppliers may be unwilling to take orders
for long-term advance delivery if they believe cus-
tomers are too greatly extended to accept delivery if the
market threatens a turn. Finally, businessmen of ex-
perience impose limits on themselves. In any event, it
is the same set of limits—those generally recognized in
the trade—that tend to be enforced even though the
agencies of enforcement may differ.
As shoe or leather buyers approach the long end of
the market range, the stimulating effect on earlier
stages of an extension of market position levels off. If an
6Fortanners and packers, the emphasis on the reservoir func-
tion of stocks eliminates the set of forces described as the long-
short market range though a rough counterpart may operate
through the intermediary of price (see below).
advance position of, say, four months in tan upper
leather is maintained, not increased, the stimulating
effect on tanners' operations and hide markets is nil.
If wholesalers or retailers simply maintain an advance
position of two months in certain sorts of shoes, the
stimulating effect on shoe manufacturers' operations is
nil.
These statements raise an important question. The
long end of the market range represents a different num-
ber of months' advance position for shoes and for
leather, and for different sorts of each. Is there reason
to believe that these different limits will be reached at
the same time? The answer is probably yes. Similar
evaluations of the general market prospects will make
each willing speculator whether in shoes or leathers, go
about the same proportion of the way toward an ex-
treme position. Further, the cumulation of optimistic
sentiment among both shoe manufacturers and distrib-
utors is likely to follow more or less the same general
course; and the evaluations themselves—since at each
stage they depend on facts about size and location of
inventories, production, and prices at every other stage
—are likely to be roughly similar for tanner, shoe man-
ufacturer, or distributor.
I conclude that additions to buying predicated on ex-
pèctations of lengthening delivery periods or rising
prices tend to level off and cease to stimulate buying.
This is most likely to take place at about thesame time
in all branches of the industry. As soon as a further in-
crease in the aggregate advance position starts to run
against resistance, one component of total buying, the
one meant to increase the ownership position, will de-
crease. Since the number of months for which stocks
are carried on hand or on order may have doubled or
tripled for some sorts of leather in a period that has
averaged around seven or eight months, the cessation
of this additional buying can be important enough to
reverse the tide of buying as a whole, at least for the
sorts of leathers in which market positions are extended,
even though selling by those firms is still rising. Since
selling at this point will often be increasing only ata
lessened rate, the reversal is still more likely tooccur.
Of course the tide of consumer takings may be strong
enough to keep shoe sales and shoe and leatherpro-
duction still rising in spite of the cessation of further
advance buying.
5. Uncertainty or Reversed Expectations about Mar-
ket Prospects. If expansion is to continue,an increase in
consumer takings may have to be strong enough to over-
ride not merely the depressing effect of the cessation of
further extension of market position, but also that of
actual retrenchment. If businessmencome to expect a
markedly reduced rate of rise in prices, becomemore
uncertain of their optimistic guesses, and expect de-THE PROCESS OF FLUCTUATION 245
livery periods or availability of merchandise to ease,
efforts to contract the market position will be in order.
It is interesting and probably important that the
growth of uncertainty alone is logically a sufficient
cause, other things the same, to convert market exten-
sion into contraction. Less market extension is justified
by a given most-probable guess as to future prices if
that guess is made less confidently than it was two
weeks ago. In addition, it may be that increased uncer-
tainty about a future upward trend in prices of raw
materials will make tanners or shoe manufacturers less
willing than formerly to offer their customers advan-
tageous terms for advance orders.7 In this case, a sup-
plier's uncertainty will cause, other things the same, a
contraction in the market position of his customers.
There are all sorts of reasons why uncertainty about
a continued rise or expectation of a fall may precede
turns in business. Many ways whereby early turns in
opinion may come about have come to our attention,
though we have not been able to accord them the ex-
plicit study they require. A decrease in unfilled orders
on the books will not only result in shortened delivery
periods, but also signify to many that market tension
has lessened. Such a decrease may well be a function
of the rate at which orders are increasing and thus tend
to decline before orders themselves. If an increasing
number of firms start to experience a reduction in their
sales even though aggregate business is still rising, this
must spread doubt about the continuing vigor of ex-
pansion. Other studies suggest that such an increase in
the number of units experiencing declines seems also
to precede decline in the aggregate.8 Hide prices typi-
cally slacken their rate of rise long enough before the
turn in industry affairs as a whole to indicate to the
businessmen who watch them that the upward surge
has weakened.9 It may also be that this retardation in
prices is itself a manifestation of all sorts of portents
visible to businessmen in their day-to-day dealings,
though unhappily invisible to the economic investiga-
tor.'°
6. Limitation to Fluctuation of Margins. This study
has specifically indicated, albeit on the basis of ex-
ceedingly slender evidence, that unit margins over ma-
terials cost for the finished product, shoes, seem to have
an inverse subcycical pattern, which does not, how-
ever, transgress certain fairly clearly defined limits. On
a number of occasions, the lower limits have been ap-
proached prior to the turn in sales or prices, so the
See Chapter 9, p. 123.
8 See Thor Hultgren, Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of
Industrial Corporations and Geoffrey H. Moore, Statistical In-
dicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Qccasional Papers 32 and 31, 1950.
See Chapter 15, pp. 217—220.
10 See Chapter 11,p. 146.
problem of keeping buying prices and selling prices in
line with one another could be a factor tending to
terminate market extension. If shoe manufacturers are
convinced that many competitors have, like themselves,
reached the point where operating margins are unduly
squeezed, if, moreover, a continuation of the condition
indicates that, for one reason or another, raising selling
prices cannot provide the remedy, then leather prices
may simply be deemed too high and buying delayed
pending the expected drop in prices.
Tanners' gross margins, though possessed of different
patterns from shoe manufacturers' margins, seem more
narrowly limited in the extent of their fluctuation. This
fact, and what tanners report about the need to gauge
the propriety of a hide price by its relationship to the
leather price, suggest that margins may serve to keep
the vertical stages of the industry in precise ste? with
one another. A tendency toward weakness in the leather
market, sensed by individual tanners as they negotiate
sales of leather, casts doubt on whether hides bought at
current prices can be sold profitably; the resultent re-
duction in hide buying, other things the same, weakens
hide prices. Tanners' large stocks make feasible these
alterations in buying relative to selling based on judg-
ments about relative prices. Since their
ened alterations in margins—is warded off and hideed
reversed by the very buying it motivates, the specific
evidence is erased the moment the cause becomes
operative. We see merely that, in spite of the fact that
hide prices are exceedingly sensitive to market condi-
tions and cattle-hide leather prices moderately co, the
difference between the current price of hides and
leather per unit of output is remarkably steady.
7. inventories and Prices. The statistics show a
sharp apposition of buyers' and sellers' stocks or inven-
tory investment in hides and leather, with a close in-
verse association between the rates of change in hide
prices and in sellers' stocks of leather and hides. All
lead the reference frame. A strong causal association
links the three phenomena. Operating through expecta-
tions about future prices, the rate of change in hide
prices affects investment in leather inventory by shoe
manufacturers and thus may help to terminate expan-
sion. By the same token, the causal association runs
from sellers' stocks to hide prices and this sets the
process in motion one link further back in the chain.
The nature of the causal link was discussed in terms of
shifts in demand and supply schedules in Chapter 15.
Also stated there was the argument that the neat ap-
position in fluctuation in buyers' and sellers' stocks may
also cause the short-term shifts in supply and demand
schedules to be asymmetrical, as schedules of suppliers
with low inventories in the neighborhood of peaks shift
more than those of buyers, whose inventories approach246 CHAPTER 17
the long end of the permissive range. If the schedules
have a certain sort of shape, this could cause the quan-
tity traded to decline.
8. Correction of Error in Anticipating Price. Buying
associated with expectations directed toward prices, de-
livery periods, and the like is subject to error just as is
buying based on expectations about sales. The correc-
tion of the error could be influential here too in delineat-
ing the pattern of fluctuation. There seems little doubt
that this type of correction operates to intensify a de-
cline once under way. What is more doubtful is its
power to hasten the end of an expansion. There is little
evidence that shoe producers expand inventories pre-
cisely in accordance with the theoretically indicated
criterion—the rateatwhich prices change. Instead, the
cumulating forces of market opinion (represented per-
haps by hide or leather prices proper) seem more
nearly to account for the course of expectation-linked
leather buying. There is no reason to suppose that no-
tions about the proper association between size of
stocks and expectations about prices or other market
conditions are formulated in terms precise enough to
dictate a readjustment of stocks when the first signs of
market weakness occur, though certainly the adjust-
ment would be required eventually. Consequently,
there is no reason to assert that the correction of error
in recent market-prospect-linked purchases (in con-
trast to modification in new market-linked buying)
carries a propensity to reverse expansion.
A possible exception involves imports. Here, as was
pointed out toward the close of Chapter 14, actual
price advantage is a precise figure (a price ratio) and,
consequently, the difference between expected and
actual advantage is likewise clear in retrospect. This
error, which tends to accord with first differences in
hide prices and therefore to lead the reference frame,
may well be reversed in current buying and thus reduce
buying as peaks are approached, other things the same.
Synchronization. The question arose in connection
with the long-short market range (4) whether buying
of various sorts of shoes or leathers would tend to reach
the long end of their range at the same time. The pre-
sumption seems to be that they would. An analogous
question concerns whether the eight factors listed as
having the capacity to hasten the advent of turns like-
wise tend to do so at the same time.
For the factors that look to patterns of consumer
buying (1, 2, and 3), a tendency to keep in step is
necessarily present. For gross margins and their influ-
ence on expectations about prices (6), a link to con-
sumer buying is also likely to be present. Shoe prices
are not raised enough to prevent a margin squeeze
when consumer demand is thought to lack vigor.
Insofar as hide prices are influenced by matters out-
side of the industry, prices and their rate of change
may have patterns that do not reflect consumer de-
mand directly or indirectly. Strong independent fluc-
tuation in supply would be one such factor. Its impact
would enter the complex of events just described
through uncertainty or reversed expectations about
market prospects (5) or through correction of error in
anticipating price (8). But strong exogçnous changes
in hide supply are This means that there are two
main directions from which the affairs of the economy
at large enter into the round of cause and effect within
the industry sequence: from the direction of consumer
income and other factors influencing consumer demand
for shoes, and from the direction of other commodity
markets and general business confidence, factors influ-
encing expectations about hide prices. On the whole, it
seems likely that the second set of factors are capable
of supporting the first set but seldom of supplanting it.
I think it likely that market extension ordinarily takes
place only when factors associated with consumer de-
mand are propitious.'2
But though adequate consumer demand (as defined
by factors 1—3) and the absence of strong external
factors tending to depress price or its rate of change
are necessary conditions to optimistic expectations,
they are not sufficient conditions. Actions based on
optimistic expectations can taper off (as factors 4, 5,
and 7 outline) and, unless swamped by still stronger
11 The one example in the interwar period was the drought of
1934. But government intervention shielded the industry from,
at least most of the impact of the abruptly increased supply of
hides.
12 This proposition ought to be subject to test, yet I am not
able to devise a satisfactory one. Failing data on orders, we have
had to identify periods of market extension in terms of the di-
vergence from usual relationships between stocks and sales or
output. The eligible periods have been limited to times when
sales or output were rising. Consequently these data (the market
profile or the output-stock ratio for tanners) cannot be con-
fronted with the question: Were retail sales rising or accelerating
when market extension took place? The answer would typically
be yes by definition.
Lacking more appropriate measures, I have used the five-
month moving average of first differences in hide prices as an
indication of market prospects and have defined periods of op-
timistic prospects as times when these data were in rising phase
except for the first two months of the phase. There are 52 months
of rising phase between 1926 (when retail data are first avail-
able) to 1940. The rate of change in consumer shoe buying in
pairs was in rising phase during 31 of these months or 60 per
cent of the time. Sales proper were in rising phase 13 of the re-
maining 21 months. Thus during only 8 months, or 15 per cent,
might it be said that retail markets were inauspicious. Two of
the 8 months occurred during the beginning of 1928 when hide
prices were undergoing the unique and extreme rise that occurred
subsequent to the time when hide and leather stocks and the
cattle cycle reached a post-World War I low. Another 4 months
took place in early 1930 and 1932 when the rate of fall in hide
prices retarded but no rise in prices followed—periods which
probably ought not to be considered times of optimistic expecta-
tion. This leaves only 2 months in the middle of 1939 as clearly
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propitious influences, can bring on a turn in output
throughout the industry. We end with a picture in
which shifts in market expectations cannot lag long
after a reversal in factors associated directly or indi-
rectly with consumer demand and its rate of change;
they could conceivably cause earlier shifts or even
additional movements.13 But, once started anywhere,
change tends tO spread everywhere, the many factors
reinforcing one another at turns as they do during ex-
pansion.
It is interesting to reflect in passing that if all indus-
tries are considered together, consumer buying is no
longer removed from this interlocked round of cause
and effect; for, the impact of buying, and consequently
production, associated with market expectationsis
likely to be large enough to influence substantially
income distributions and consequently consumer buy-
ing.
CUMULATING CONTRACTION
If reversal in the industry were confined to a return
to hand-to-mouth buying on the part of all distributors
or processors who had extended their market position,
its duration and severity would be short and mild. But
all of the movements that we have designated as sub-
cyclical seem also to have been characterized by a
drop, or at least a marked leveling, in consumer buying.
Accordingly, we find that the same spiral of cause and
effect that characterized recovery now operates in the
reverse direction to deepen retrenchment.
Consumer buying typically decreases. For some
time, retailers' expectations have been too optimistic,
and short-term orders are reduced to permit stocks to
recede to their designed level. This level is lower than
formerly, since a lower level of sales makes some re-
duction in stocks desirable; the effort to reduce service
stocks in line with reduced sales may be present for
wholesaler and shoe producer too. The achievement of
desired retrenchment is probably not easy and takes a
while to effect. The most urgent need for reduction is
likely to lie precisely where curtailment of orders is not
the appropriate therapy. Stocks will be high in the
poorly selling lines or in seasonal items that missed the
market. Items of this sort will never be reordered in any
quantity, so reduction of stocks can mainly be achieved
by markdowns. If the preceding rise was one in which
the industry extended its market position, there will, of
course, be an effort to contract it. Thus both stocks on
hand and especially on order will be desired to fall
more than sales.
At first thought one might expect the contraction to
be abrupt, more so than the corresponding rise. But
our data show little indication that it is, and this is not
13 An example may be the rise to the sharp peak in early 1928.
really surprising. All men in an industry do nct change
their minds simultaneously. Some people are naturally-
optimistic and others naturally pessimistic, some well
informed and some poorly informed, some deal in mer-
chandise that is selling well, whether because of
thesort of goods, and others in merchandise-
that is selling poorly. Consequently the reversal of
men's ideas about future trends has a considerable
temporal scatter.
But even when a man's expectations about the future-
course of prices has turned bearish, the extentwhich
buying can be cut below the needs for current replace-.
ment is limited. Insofar as price expectation alone has..
motivated the previous extension of the market posi-
tion, it can be cut abruptly. But this motive is usually-
combined with the expectation of lengthened delivery
periods and of difficulty in getting the more desirable
goods. At this stage of the subcycle, though there is no-
longer the backlog of unfilled orders that may have
characterized many peaks, finished stocks of suppliers,
especially tanners' stocks of leather, are and the.
absolute level of factory operation fairly high, so that
although an easing of bottlenecks is expected, and in-
deed may already have occurred, there is no reason to.
expect an extreme drop in the length of time required
to get delivery of the choicer items. Finally, though the-
size of stock in the lines that sell well can soon be.
brought in line with intentions, the slow-moving num-
bers, always too plentiful in any stock, resist regimen-
tation.
On the downward as well as the upward bank, tan-.
ners seem to cushion rather than reinforce contraction.
Their buying now exceeds their selling as their total
stocks of hides and leather rise. However, it is signifi-
cant that their purchases of the domestic supply of
packer hides tend to be less than the current kill, and
purchases of foreign hides and country hides
dropsharply under these con-
ditions and this has manifold repercussions.
The downward spiral continues: reduced selling,
lower requirements for service stocks, shortened de-.
livery periods for seasonal merchandise, pessimistic.
expectations about prices and consequent reduction of'
market position, further drop in prices, further pessi-.
mism, further reduction in buying relative to selling in
one establishment after another. This spiral within the.
industry is typically supported by falling consumer in-
come and often by falling commodity prices in other•
fields.
THE TROUGH
But on the downward path as on the upwnrd one,,
retardation and reversal tend to occur as a logical de-
velopment of the factors set in motion during the"248 CHAPTER 17
previous months. We review the process described for
the advent of the peak (using the same paragraph
numbers for each factor discussed) and endeavor to
point out when and how the processes that tend to
bring on expansion seem to differ, at least with respect
to the relative importance of the several contributing
elements, from those that bring on contraction.
1. Physical versus Dollar Volume of Consumer Buy-
ing; and 2. Correction of Error in Anticipating Sales. If
shoe buying, measured in physical volume, ceases to
fall at an increasing rate—a condition that may be
brought about by falling shoe prices as well as by a
retardation of the decline in consumer income—there
will be a tendency for orders for at-once delivery to
rise, reversing the pessimistic error in advance plan-
ning. This tendency for, orders to pick up will be
stronger for the suppliers of some sorts of stores in
some sections of the country than for others and, in-
sofar as their sales are watched as indicators of future
trends, will have more than proportional importance.
3. Sales-Linked Stock Ob/ective. If there is a tend-
ency for distributors and manufacturers to require their
stocks to bear a close positive association to sales, the
correction element (2), and consequently its tendency
to accelerate turns, will be emphasized. We rejected
the notion that this factor is likely to advance turns at
peaks (though it would increase the amplitude of
fluctuation); for the objective is probably held too
loosely to have this effect in view of the shape of fluc-
tuation in sales. In the neighborhood of troughs, how-
ever, the low level of stocks may mean that stores ex-
periencing rises in sales need to increase stocks fairly
promptly while stores whose sales continue to decline
can no longer afford to decrease stock much further.
In the aggregate, this would increase both orders in-
tended to increase stocks and those required to reverse
the pessimistic bias in the forecast of sales. Thus, the
asymmetry of the impact on intended inventory in-
vestment of sales-tied stock objectives, depending on
whether firms are experiencing a rise or a fall in sales,
may contribute toward early turns at troughs.
4. The Long-Short Market Range. Retrenchment by
shoe merchant or manufacturer in their advance posi-
tion in materials buying, which has caused selling to
exceed buying for some months, approaches the short
end of the long-short market range and slows down.
This is, of course, the counterpart of the leveling of
market extension described in connection with the up-
per turn. It may be that pessimistic opinion spreads
more abruptly than does optimism, but without spe-
cific investigation one can only surmise. Also, the num-
ber of weeks' supply that constitutes the short end of
the market, range is doubtless defined more sharply
than for the long end. In any event it takes a while
for desires for retrenchment, however defined, to be
achieved. When once they are, cumulating retrench-
ment approaches its limits and starts to level off.
5. Reversed or Uncertain Expectations about Mar-
ket Prospects; and 8. Correction of Error in Antici pat-
ing Prices. Just how changed evaluations of market
prospects enter into the picture of approaching revival
is difficult to say. My impression is that opinion tends
to stay despondent for some time after signs of im-
provement appear. Also, uncertainty is not likely to
play the same part here as it does at peaks. Whether
incorrect guesses about market prospects (8) are ac-
tually corrected fast enough to influence the time at
which business picks up, as contrasted with the amount
that it rises when once under way, is also not at all
clear. In connection with expansions, we noted that the
relatively exact price comparisons associated with the
decision to import hides may provide a situation where
recognizable error is a function of the rate of change of
prices, which, in turn, tends to lead the reference pat-
tern. The tendency to lead seems less strong at troughs
than at peaks. In any event, imports are usually small
at this phase of the subcycle.
6. Limitation to the Fluctuation of Margins. As far
as one can judge, margins of shoe manufacturers influ-
ence the trough in a fashion symmetrical to their influ-
ence at the peak. For tanners, the defense of margins
presumably plays the same part in transferring firm-
ness in hide markets to leather markets that it played
'at peaks in transferring weakness in the leather mar-
kets to hide markets. Perhaps this is what tanners mean
when they say that leather and shoe markets tend to
lead prices down whereas hide markets lead them up.
7. Inventories and Prices. The impact of this factor
at troughs will presumably be symmetrical to its im-
pact at peaks.
Cyclical Process
This picture of cumulating expansion, of hesitation
and reversal generated within the process itself, of
cumulating contraction, like expansion fomenting its
own reversal, applies to what we have called subcycles
in the shoe, leather, hide sequence—waves of activity
of ten of shorter duration or of less intensity than cycles;
they may be bounded by peaks or troughs in the
major as well as in these minor movements. Since the
major peaks and troughs are also subcydical peaks and
troughs, all that has been said of the process that
brings on turns applies to them too. But it may be that
the reverse statement could not be made—that at
major turns additional factors operate that are not
present at minor ones. In addition, it is necessary to ask
whether the process whereby expansion and contrac-
tion cumulate is significantly different for cycles andTHE PROCESS OF FLUCTUATION 249
subcycles. Since the frame of reference remains the
single industrial sequence, only a limited answer to
these questions can be given.
CUMULATION OF EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION
Conceptually, the distinction is not nearly so direct
and simple between major and minor phases as be-
tween major and minor turns. A major phase (a cycli-
cal phase) is usually, though not always (e.g. the
1937 to 1938 major recession), interrupted by minor
movements. Sometimes the interruption takes the
shape of a hesitation in a downward sweep, as did the
expansion of 1930 to 1931. Other times the minor move-
ment has a more or less horizontal, rather than sloped,
axis as in 1932—1933. Other movements fall somewhere
between the two types.
Cycles in the shoe, leather, hide industry accord with
strong fluctuations in the economy as a whole. Though
there is a great deal of evidence pointing to subcycles
in the economy at large, it has not as yet been system-
atically and critically examined. In any event, it is clear
enough that the familiar business cycles, as designated
in the National Bureau reference chronology, are, with
perhaps one exception,'4 at least longer or stronger
fluctuations than any hypothetical general counterpart
of subcycles in the shoe, leather, bide industry. This
means that the economic background to fluctuation in
the industry is different for major and for minor move-
ments, inevitably this must influence industry affairs.
More specifically, fluctuation in consumer income is
materially stronger during business cycles than during
most of the other fluctuations in the industry. In conse-
quence consumer shoe buying undergoes heavier
change. This is true in spite of the fact that there may
be some tendency for the response of shoe buying rela-
tive to income to be a little stronger during the minor
waves. The stronger fluctuations in commodity prices
during major fluctuations must also reinforce fluctua-
tion in the shoe, leather, hide industry during business
cycles, if only because of the strong impact of expecta-
tions on business conduct. Though perhaps less directly
relevant than the changes in consumer income and
prices, cyclical fluctuations in all sorts of other outside
events also certainly have some bearing on how expan-
sion and contraction in the shoe, leather, hide industry
proceed during the major, as distinguished from the
minor, waves. By and large, such factors would tend to
intensify the severity of subcyclical phases that are in
phase with cyclical phases and damp those out of
phase.
Second, we have learned that within the industry
chain of cause and effect, the rate at which stocks in-
crease or decrease does not play nearly so important a
'4 I refer to the contraction dated from late 1926 to late 1927.
part during cycle phases as during subcycle phases
either in deepening or in damping fluctuation, which-
ever is their characteristic role. Indeed, if we link these
findings to those of Abramovitz, it would appear that,
broadly speaking, the relative importance of inventory
change in total fluctuation in output is inversely asso-
ciated with the duration of the fluctuation.
Third, shoe prices either at wholesale or retail, as far
as the available statistics indicate, seem to undergo
substantial movement chiefly during the major busi-
ness fluctuations. There were exceptions of course, such
as the sharp spurt during the National Recovery Ad-
ministration, but broadly the statement holds, provid-
ing only the overt price change reflected in the crude
statistics is being discussed. In addition to the obvi-
ous implications, our analysis of the factors underlying
changes in hide prices suggests that during these major
movements, this fact may cause some intensification
within the industry sequence of fluctuation associated
with change, or expectation of change, in hide prices.
During subcycles, the same fact would mean an inten-
sification of paracycical phases and a damping of
contracycical ones.
PEAKS AND TROUGHS
•Because of the sluggishness of finished-goods prices,
the process of reversal at major and that at minor turns
may differ somewhat. At major peaks, rising consumer
income may be partially dissipated by price change,
with the corresponding damped impact on physical
flows at earlier stages. At troughs, the fall in prices may
partly counteract the impact of falling income.'5 But
the studies of the previous chapter also suggest that
the presence or absence of overt change in shoe prices
may affect hide prices too. When retail or wholesale
shoe prices are moving, hide prices may continue in the
same direction after events have taken place that other-
wise might have been associated with a turn in raw
material prices. The combination of a partial dissipa-
tion of consumer spending in price rises and an ex-
tended support of the rise in hide prices may, at these
major turns, tend to substitute speculative demand for
real demand, thus maintaining prosperity at the ex-
pense of a more violent subsequent readjustment. The
reverse would apply at certain of the major troughs.
Perhaps all that emerges from this meager story is
that at those points where activity in a single industry
'5 A corollary of the facts that retail prices move primarily
at major turns, and that they lag, is the tendency for shoe sales
expressed in current prices to lag at the major turns. This fact
would be important were subcycles found at about the same
time in industry at large, and were the characteristics of shoe
sales and prices here discussed found for many other products.
For the study of a single industry, it seems to have little signffi-
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derives sustenance from broad economic events, indus-
try response is stronger when the sustenance is, for
good or ill, more plentiful than when it is not. But this
difference in degree becomes a difference in kind in
connection with retail prices, which, because of their
great lethargy, are likely to move at all only under the
heavy and prolonged battering of a major fluctuation.
At the same time, movement once initiated sets off a
chain of events within the industry. Finally, inventory
fluctuation plays a far more important part relative to
fluctuation in customers' takings during subcycles than
during cycles.
Summary: Fluctuation in the Industry
The statistics for the shoe, leather, hide sequence
have traced a picture of fluctuation during the interwar
period in which not only the familiar business cycles
are mirrored by events in the industry, but in addition
a number of minor waves appear.
Sales of shoes to the final consumer reflect the chang-
ing amount of money that consumers have to spend
with a fidelity surprising for a single consumer good.
Since income shows minor fluctuations, so does shoe
buying; indeed it seems to enlarge on the amplitude of
these movements conveyed by the income stream. The
figures show waves in physical activity reaching peaks
and troughs at about the same time in shoe buying by
consumers, shoe production, and leather tanning. Since
all these operations take time to perform, their syn-
chronous turning points are puzzling.
The statistics also reveal that when sales are increas-
ing or decreasing, so are stocks of shoes held by retail-
ers and of leather held by shoe manufacturers. This
means that provision for increasing inventories is piled
on top of provision for increasing sales, and the ampli-
tude of fluctuation at the earlier stage relative to the
later one is thereby increased. Since fluctuations in in-
ventory appear normally to have a shorter periodicity
than business cycles, the amplitude of subcycles is aug-
mented by waves in inventory investment a great deal
more than the amplitude of the longer, stronger fluc-
tuations. Addition to stocks on order as well as on hand
further accentuates fluctuation. Snowballing fluctua-
tion, however, does not continue all the way back to
the raw material. Stocks of tanners respond inversely
to minor waves in activity. Packers' and dealers' stocks
of raw hides are sharply inverse. The prices of raw ma-
terials, on the other hand, fluctuate with great severity
and in generally synchronous conformity to demand.
Leather prices parallel these fluctuations in muted
form, whereas shoe prices respond largely to the major
business tides.
These figures all pose riddles. The first, the virtually
synchronous flow at each of the major stages, was
spelled out early in the book, in Chapter 8. The answer,
at a superficial level, lies in the fact that orders for
shoes placed by retailers seem to anticipate turns in
retail sales by a few months. This lead of orders is
maintained, but not, in all probability, much aug-
mented, in successively earlier stages. The explanation
of the lead of orders starts at the retail where
objectives for stocks are reasonably clear and firm, and
profitable operation highly vulnerable to delays in re-
ceipt of seasonable merchandise. Here the tendency
toward a lead seems to originate. But it receives sup-
port at other stages, even perhaps at the earliest one,
where the amplitude of fluctuation instead of being
augmented is damped.
•Eight distinct processes may contribute to this tend-
ency for orders at one or more stages in the vertical
sequence to reverse before retail sales. Moreover, this
is almost sure to be an incomplete list; small reciprocat-
ing mechanisms are imbedded in quite specific busi-
ness situations into many of which we have certainly
failed to delve. For an industry such as the shoe,
leather, hide group, where price responds more to
changes in demand than to independent changes in
supply, there seems to be a tendency for these factors
to reinforce one another in bringing on a reversal.
These reciprocating processes fall into several cate-
gories. One concerns the disparity between dollar sales
and their power to stimulate physical flows of goods
when retail prices are changing. Two involve the char-
acter of the stock objective per Se: Does it include a
link between output and stock? Is the objective, what-
ever it is, firm enough so that failure to achieve it will
be corrected in new buying (a process that seems to
apply primarily at the retail stage)? Two others in-
volve the timing of buying on the basis of judgments
about prospects concerning adequacy of selections,
speed of delivery, and prices. Alterations in market
position predicated on these judgments have limits,
albeit elastic ones, set by the long-short market range;
consequently fluctuation could not proceed indefinitely
in one direction, even were optimism or pessimism
maintained at a given level; however, it is not likely to
be so maintained. Finally, three other processes involve
prices—either prices proper or the relationship be-
tween them (operating margins )—and their impact on
judgments about the timing of buying relative to sell-
ing. This set of factors is capable of causing the setting
ahead of turns in earlier stages relative to turns in re-
tail sales (timing acceleration), whether or not it also
causes amplitude acceleration. For tanners and pack-
ers(whose inventory investment or disinvestment
serves to mute fluctuations in the How of leather and
hides) can introduce a tendency to advance turns inthe physical flows through the impact on their buying
and selling of considerations centered on price and
margins.
These are, perhaps, the major findings of this inves-
tigation. They may be listed without much difficulty.
But it would be desirable also to indicate the under-
pinning of fact on which a specific inference rests. Yet
it is virtually impossible to fill this gap because of the
very complex interrelationship between many facts
and any one inference and among the several infer-
ences. This means that one is powerless to help the
conscientious reader to a critical appraisal of the final
conclusions; fundamentally, this valuable check can
come only through the tedious study of the work as a
whole. An illustration will perhaps indicate how fact
and inference hang together.
Investment in retailers' shoe stocks is broadly syn-
chronous with output; investment in manufacturers'
leather stocks leads output by several months. On the
surface, these facts could be explained by a firm sales-
linked stock objective that is realized either promptly
or with a short lag. The earlier turn in stocks at the
earlier stage is consistent with the progressive accel-
eration that this principle implies. Yet this is not the
explanation I proffer. Why not? First, in view of the
tendency for the rate of change in sales to lead sales
proper by short intervals, in view also of what retailers
say about their stock objectives, in view of what we
know of how far ahead of any possible knowledge of
sales some orders must be placed, in view, finally, of
what we see in regression analysis of the association
between stocks and sales, there is no reason to believe
that an intended stock change that paralleled the rate
of change in sales would result in an actual stock
change generally synchronous with sales. A more pre-
cisely enforceable intention is required—a designed
level for stocks that is at least partly independent of
the confusion of the link to changing sales. Accord-
ingly, we emphasize the correction of error (departure
from any fiim intention) rather than the particular
character of the ihtention (ratio to sales or to change
in sales) in explaining the timing characteristics of
shoe retailers' inventory investment.
Shoe manufacturers, because of their foreknowledge
of requirements, may well be in a position to effectuate
an intention for stocks to parallel output. However,
what they say about how they determine the volume of
leather buying and what the time series show of paral-
lelism between hide prices and stocks (and regression
analysis supports) indicate that expectations about
market conditions and prices will be an important de-
terminant of the size of stocks. But if so, it is likely that
inventory investment of shoe manufacturers based on
market prospects will tend to turn earlier than output
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orretail sales for virtually all of the reasons (4—8,
above) mentioned as responsible for bringing on turns
and also because retailers' orders seem to lead. We
even see this tendency appearing at the retail stage
in the lead of the market profile and the information
yielded by the correlation analysis of pat-
terns of production.'6 Hence I reject the conventional
acceleration argument as the chief explanation of the
observed timing characteristics of inventory investment
of shoe manufacturers.
How different is the situation for tanners' in-process
stocks of sole leather! Here again the picture conforms
to the specifications of the output-linked stock objec-
tive. Indeed, this it does so precisely that if we simply
compute what stock would be, given the pattern of
wettings and a fixed in-process interval, these hypo-
thetical stocks nearly reproduce the course of actual
stock. There is little else to explain; ergo the explana-
tion is highly satisfactory. But note that the pattern of
stock in tanneries resulted from the pattern of input,
not from that of output plus a desired (or needed)
stock in process. And in support of this statement I can
do no more than refer to the sense of Chapters 13 and
14. Yet the meaning of the observed relationship is
quite different depending on what causes what.
In fine, and I cannot support these statements in cap-
sule form, this investigation yields a picture of a single
industry sequence where all sorts of processes seem
bent on converting stability into fluctuation or on excit-
ing fluctuation received from the external environment
—through the impact of consumer income on shoe
buying and the climate of opinion which any business-
man breathes—to further fluctuation. But further fluc-
tuation is itself converted into reversal by the con-
nivance of most of the circumstances under which
shoes, leather, and hides are produced, marketed, and
sold at a price. Fluctuation is the rule. It is stability that
defies explanation.
Problem of Verification and Extension
These statements are based on the study of a single
sequence of industries for the period 1921 to 1940. Di-
rectly, they apply to that industry for that period. Yet
clearly we make a broader claim than this. The title
contains the words case study. These words, of course,
imply that the industry is a species of a wider genus.
Were this not believed to be so, an economist would
hardly care to expend effort so prodigiously on the in-
vestigation of an industry responsible for less than 2
per cent of the consumer segment of the national prod-
uct.
The "case" has afforded an opportunity to observe
16Chapter9, Tables 39 and 40.
THE PROCESS OF FLUCTUATION252 CHAPTER17
the process of change concretely and intimately. By
observing and then ordering and schematizing the
process, a theory evolves. It is a partial theory of fluc-
tuation that deals especially with one aspect of the
dynamics of turns. But it is not only partial; it is incom-
plete even for the aspect with which it deals. For it is
not possible to spell out the full meaning of the recipro-
cating mechanisms associated with market prospects
and prices (rather than with sales) within the frame-
work of a single industry. To complete the story it is
necessary to deal with the impact of these factors on
sales themselves through their impact on output, and
thence on the income stream, and perhaps too via the
tie among various critical prices. For this the economy
as a whole, rather than the single industry, must pro-
vide the frame of reference.
The case study, in other words, is only worth its salt
if it has some general applicability that is subject to
test. But tests in other environments not only justify,
they also verify, the case study. The key to this two-
way dependence lies, I think, in this fact: If the dy-
namics that we have uncovered is true of the shoe,
leather, hide sequence for the interwar period, it must,
with appropriate transposition, be true of other se-
quences and other times. The reason is simply that the
tendency to fluctuate, and for fluctuation to have limits
and therefore to tend to reverse, derives from basic
business objectives, problems, and procedures that
cannot possibly, except in their particular manifesta-
tions, be peculiar to the period or the industry that has
been examined. This means that the study can both be
tested and be put to work by an investigation of the
shoe, leather, hide industry in the postwar era, by em-
pirical examination of a sort I have not been able to
undertake of certain key factors in the reciprocating
process, and by study of other industries. A word on
each of these avenues of advancement.
THE SHOE, LEATHER, HIDE INDUSTRY TODAY
A study. of the shoe, leather, hide industry in the
postwar era would start with the questions developed
for the earlier stretch of years. The answers, however,
would not be identical. Some of the variables that the
present study has selected as important are known to
have changed. On the basis of the character of the
change, it is possible to suggest in what way patterns
may differ for recent years. One such set of differences
relates to consumer shoe buying and its association
with aggregate income payments. Compared with
1929 to 1940, the high level of income and its far gentler
change probably means that in recent years shoe buy-
ing may have been somewhat less tightly tied to in-
come, and the influence of other factors of the sort that
we examined may be more apparent.17 The increased
use of materials other than leather in shoe manufacture
may cause the link of the industry sequence to hide
prices to be less sharp than formerly. If, as may be the
case, tanners carry smaller stocks than they used to and
tanning to order has increased, the story as told in this
book requires further modification in the current set-
ting; but it is a modification in emphasis, not in the
pieces of which it is composed. One final illustration:
Our analysis of hide prices led to the conclusion that
of the three sorts of factors by which most of the
influences operating on prices could be represented—
leather shipments, the stock-location ratio, and prob-
ably shoe prices—the speculative elements, represented
by the stock-location ratio, were less important after
than before the traumatic experience of 1929 and 1930.
It seems not at all unlikely that these shifts have
continued and that the finished-goods markets (repre-
sented by shoe prices) also have increased in impor-
tance.
FLUCTUATION IN OTHER INDUSTRLES
Consider next the application of the partial theories
of fluctuation based on study of the shoe, leather, bide
sequence to other industries. For each group of busi-
nessmen in the chain, we found different factors, or the
same factors in differing proportions, influencing the
way demand moved from the sale of products
to the purchase of raw materials. Corresponding dif-
ferences in the temporal relationship of sale and pur-
chase resulted. The same factors that produced these
differences within the industry sequence ought to
produce them in other business environments. Their
enumeration should constitute a sort of check list,
which, applied to a given industry, might provide a
basis for judging, after investigation, whether
of raw materials is likely to fluctuate more than sales of
finished products, and whether intrinsic reciprocating
mechanisms would presumably be present. I outline
them in Table 62 simply as a reminder to someone
familiar with what has preceded. The letter T indicates
a factor that bears on the timing of turns, with the
capacity, under certain circumstances, of tending to
produce reversals. The letter A indicates a factor bear-
ing on amplitude—a tendency to add to the amplitude
of fluctuation if it appears in the first column and to
subtract from it if it appears in the second column.
The table underscores the fact that a tendency
toward short fluctuations will be stronger in some in-
dustries than in others. Will the extra fluctuations be
See Chapter 6 and Ruth P. Mack, Factors Influencing Con-
sumption: An Experimental Analysis of Shoe Buying, National
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TABLE 62
Factors Iafluencing Patterns of Association of an Enterprise's Buying and Selling
FACTORS MAKING FOR LARGER AMPLITUDE OF FLUCTUATION (A),
OR EARLIER TURNS (T), OR BOTH, IN BUYINC RELATIVE TO SELLING
1. Inventory objectives and the capacity to achieve them in the
first instance
a. Precise high-priority inventory objectives specifying a de-
sired absolute size (T°) or positive association to sales
(T* and A)
b. Positive association to sales, even if not stubbornly en-
forced, increases the amplitude of fluctuation at the earlier
stage (A)
c. The need to order substantial portions of expected sales
ahead of time without foreknowledge of sales (T°); the
amplitude of fluctuation is increased when this portion
varies as suggested in (2) and (3) below
d. Final demand tending, at least for significant segments of
the total, to retard before reversing (T°)
*Timingacceleration may only occur from a, c, and d in combi-
nation
2. Delivery period having a positive association to the level of
demand and its rate of change (T and A); this is likely to ap-
ply to style merchandise having high seasoned variability of
demand
3. Raw materials prices that tend to parallel changes in demand
(A)
4. Inducements to anticipate short-term movements in prices or
availability of merchandise in the timing of buying (A and
T); though probably chiefly when condition stipsilated in
(3) holds
Contributing factors:
a. Staple materials with low carrying costs
b. Highly variable prices of materials with limited substitut-
ability among materials or factors of production
c.Materials constituting a large portion of total cost
d. Relatively inflexible selling prices
e. A well-defined period of option in buying
f. Ability to extend the market position by placing more and
longer advance orders that are welcomed by sellers
g. The need in times of expected stringency to get additional
supplies from remote places
FACTORS MAKING FOR SMALLER AMPLITUDE OF AT LhAST BRIEF
FLUCTUATION (A), OR EARLIER (T), OR ROTH,
IN BUYING RELATIVE TO SELLING
1. High priority for maintaining a regular flow of production;
contributing factors:
a. Perishable raw materials and durable, staple, finished
products
b. Long period in production
c. Materials prices that parallel demand, thus lessening finan-
cial burden of stocks when demand is low
2. Seasonal patterns or other inflexibilities in availability of ma-
terials making it necessary to buy along with the tracls as goods
become available at a price (A)
3. Raw materials prices primarily associated with changes in
supply that tend to occur independently of the volume of de-
mand (A)
4. Inducements to buy more heavily when margins qn. current-
price basis are advantageous and vice versa
Contributing factors:
a. A tendency for heavier than usual buying to increasebuy-
ing prices for raw materials and weaken selling prices of
the finished article (A)
b. Flexible selling prices linked to more or less current ma-
terials prices (A)
c. A poorly defined period of option
d. Buying largely for immediate delivery (A)
FACTORS MAKING FOR EARLIER TURNS (T) WITHOUT A PREDICTABLE IMPACT ON AMPLITUDE, IN
BUYING RELATIVE TO SELLING
5. A well-defined period of option: limits to the number of weeks' supply generally thought to be
proper under specified conditions (T)
6. Limits to the rate of change in prices that is expected, or to the confidence with which it is
expected (T)
Contributing factors:
a. Actual prices that retard before they turn
b. Margins that, reaching a given point, are thought to suggest a reversal in prices
c. Partitioned market, such as three types of hide supply
d. Nonsymmetrical shifts in supply and demand schedules due to differences in subcycical
patterns of stocks of buyers and sellers and their influence on price making
likely to occur at the same time for most industries in
which they appear? Summary inspection of many time
series suggests tentatively some fairly general partici-
pation of industry at large in at least most of the sub-
cycles found in the shoe, leather, hide industry, 1923 to
1940. Our study of this industry raises the possibility
that at the two ends of the sequence—consumer buy-
ing, and sometimes prices (in industries where change
in the price of raw materials is more influenced by
change in demand than by independent change in sup-
ply)—a tendency toward synchronization among in-
dustries may be present.'8 But certainly the niatter re-
quires careful empirical investigation.
But whether or not, upon investigation, confluence
during short movements is found, it does exist during
18 See Chapter 4, Tables 11 and 12.CHAPTER17
cyclical phases and at the times usually recognized as
points in business affairs. At those times, the
'insights that we have gained in this study apply to a
fundamental aspect of how reversals in business take
-place. The insights involve how, under current business
institutions, the sequential steps of marketing and pro-
a consumer good can give rise in all sorts of
'ways to tendencies for the direction of change to re-
'verse. This decline or rise, once initiated within a siz-
able number of such sequences, can set off a decline or
rise in sales of capital-goods industries, since the vol-
ume of expected sales in the next year or two is an
important determinant of when to purchase machinery
or even plant. From these secondary reversals, further
decline cumulates. But business reversals, as a whole,
do not abide by simple rules. On other occasions a
weakening or strengthening in capital-goods industries
'may be the leader, and intended investment in inven-
'tories or in ownership position add its weight to the
•nascent reversal. One way or another, these factors
'which partly originate within the industry sequence
are important links in the business-cycle chain.
KEY POINTS OF FACT
The effort to make sense out of the information for'
'the shoe, leather, hide industry has resulted in high-
lighting some aspects of the complex of events and in
subduing others. At least some of those on which em-
phasis has fallen might offer opportunities for useful
empirical investigation. I mention a few examples.
Questions have come up at many points concerning the
association between seasonal patterns and cyclical and
subcycical characteristics. Partly related to this broad
question and partly independent of it are several spe-
cific ones. Changes in delivery periods and in adequacy
of selection, which seem to play an important part in
fluctuating market prospects, require forthright study
of a sort that we have not even touched upon for this
industry. The same is true of the third factor involved
in changed judgments about market prospects, namely
expectations about materials prices and their relation-
ship to selling prices. But it is interesting that the
urgent questions in the area seem, on the basis of this
study, to involve not so much the precise character of
thebusinessman'sconceptionoffutureprices—
whether it is formulated in terms of minirnax, focus
gain or loss, or probability distribution—as how these
conceptions, however formulated, change over time,
how confidence in them waxes or wanes, and how ac-
tions are based on them.
Another set of questions, partly related and partly
separate, involves what I have called the long-short
market range. Is this a legitimate concept? How elastic
are its boundaries? How variable as among industries
or parts of industries is its duration? Does the character
of the contractual relationships between buyer and
seller—whetheradvanceorders may beplaced,
whether they are encouraged, and if so, under what
circumstances—play some part in the process? I select
these questions from innumerable ones merely to illus-
trate problems that are critical and that are subject to
sharply focused empirical study for many industries at
once. Mentioning them makes me acutely conscious of
how desirable it would have been to study them di-
rectly for the shoe, leather, hide sequence. The fact
that their importance was only appreciated when fur-
ther detailed investigation was out of the question
brings sadly to mind the cumbersome process of this
study.
We started with a broad problem—the impact of
consumption on business cycles. Study of all the facts
that could be amassed about the industry led to the
formulation of secondary questions. A scheme for an-
swering them provided hypotheses, which, by further
investigation, we endeavored to test. Efforts to test
these involved the formulation of tertiary questions,
hypotheses, further empirical study. Thus theory yields
no priority to empirical investigation nor investigation
to theory. They walk abreast. And there is no place to
stop.
Abruptly, then, this book that has been over a dec-
ade in the making ends—a piece of unfinished business.